This article addresses the contributions of the literature on the new mechanistic philosophy of science for the scientific practice of model building in ecology. This is reflected in a one-to-one interdisciplinary collaboration between an ecologist and a philosopher of science during science-in-the-making. We argue that the identification, reconstruction and understanding of mechanisms is context-sensitive, and for this case study mechanistic modeling did not present a normative role but a heuristic one. We expect our study to provides useful epistemic tools for (...) the improvement of empirically-riven work in the debates about mechanistic explanation of ecological phenomena. (shrink)

Placebos are often used by clinicians, usually deceptively and with little rationale or evidence of benefit, making their use ethically problematic. In contrast with their typical current use, a provocative line of research suggests that placebos can be intentionally exploited to extend analgesic therapeutic effects. Is it possible to extend the effects of drug treatments by interspersing placebos? We reviewed a database of placebo studies, searching for studies that indicate that placebos given after repeated administration of active treatments acquire medication-like (...) effects. We found a total of 22studies in both animals and humans hinting of evidence that placebos may work as a sort of dose extender of active painkillers. Wherever effective in relieving clinical pain, such placebo use would offer several advantages. First, extending the effects of a painkiller through the use of placebos may reduce total drug intake and side effects. Second, dose-extending placebos may decrease patient dependence. Third, using placebos along with active medication, for part of the course of treatment, should limit dose escalation and lower costs. Importantly, provided that nondisclosure is pre-authorized in the informed consent process and that robust evidence indicates therapeutic benefit comparable to that of standard full-dose therapeutic regimens, introducing dose-extending placebos into the clinical arsenal should be considered. This novel prospect of placebo use has the potential to change our general thinking about painkiller treatments, the typical regimens of painkiller applications, and the ways in which treatments are evaluated. (shrink)

Philosophy of Science in Practice (PoSiP) has the “practice of science” as its object of research. Notwithstanding, it does not possess yet any general or specific methodology in order to achieve its goal. Instead of sticking to one protocol, PoSiP takes advantage of a set of approaches from different fields. This thesis takes as a starting point a collaborative and interdisciplinary research between two Ph.D. students from distinct areas: ecology and philosophy. This collaboration showed how a scientist could benefit from (...) philosophy of science (in this case study the philosophical approach of. mechanistic explanation) to construct a model of his explanandum, by means of heuristics approach (heuristics as an instrument but also a methodological approach) and, also allowed philosophy of science take a closer look into the scientific practice to investigate how explanations are constructed and how scientific understanding is achieved (in this thesis, with a dialogue with the contextual theory of scientific understanding). As a result, it is asserted that (i) mechanistic explanation possess limitations but may work as epistemic instruments that mediate between theories, data, scientists, and models; (ii) explanation construction and scientific understanding deeply relies on intuition; (iii) scientific understanding is an instant, a moment, a temporary achievement, and its process may happen in degrees; (iv) philosophy of science, by means of heuristics process, may enhance scientists’ epistemic virtues, improving his academic skills, by means of self-evaluation. This research shows that interdisciplinarity and collaborative work can act, through heuristics, as a toolbox for PoSiP to achieve its goal of understanding how science is made. Despite its success, an analysis of this collaborative practice leads to some fundamental issues. First, philosophy of science in practice is a philosophy of past practice, in that the majority of examples used by mainstream PoSiP come from the final products of science. Second, is it philosophy of [science in practice] or philosophy of science [in practice]? How to practice philosophy of scientific practice and, how to practice interdisciplinarity in the philosophy of scientific practices simultaneously to its scientific activity? This research exposes the epistemic role heuristics and interdisciplinarity possess as methodological toolboxes for philosophy of science in practice. It is defended that other ways of constructing sciences would be through different dynamics such as collaborative networks and interdisciplinarity research contributing to the vision of Trading Zones from Peter Galison, in which bridges between specialized disciplines are created in order to exchange knowledge and information. (shrink)

The term ‘scientism’ has not attracted consensus about its meaning or about its scope of application. In this paper, we consider Mizrahi’s suggestion to distinguish ‘Strong’ and ‘Weak’ scientism, and the consequences this distinction may have for philosophical methodology. While we side with Mizrahi that his definitions help advance the debate, by avoiding verbal dispute and focussing on questions of method, we also have concerns about his proposal as it defends a hierarchy of knowledge production. Mizrahi’s position is that Weak (...) Scientism should be adopted, stating that “of all the knowledge we have, scientific knowledge is the best knowledge”. This version of scientism, however, has consequences for philosophical methodology. In particular, if one conceives of philosophy as an a priori discipline and holds Weak Scientism, the introduction of empirical methods in philosophy may threaten its very essence or soul. In this chapter, we will defend the move to adopt empirical methods in philosophy and argue that, rather than threatening its essence or soul, these methods put philosophy in a better position to contribute to knowledge production, an endeavor shared with the sciences, and in a very interdisciplinary spirit. Our point of disagreement with Mizrahi is that we should avoid any hierarchy of knowledge, and instead focus on what each perspective -- scientific, philosophical, historical, or other -- can contribute to understanding phenomena. (shrink)

Philosophy of science studies science and the production of scientific knowledge. Usually, philosophical investigations of this field focus mainly on metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological aspects of science. Despite being divided into the general philosophy of science and philosophy of special sciences, philosophy of science, in a general way, is still distant from scientific practice per se. In order to fill this gap, a third subfield has emerged, philosophy of science in practice. This article provides a brief introduction to the philosophy (...) of science in practice and to the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice. It discusses its goals, methods, its social and empirical engagement. It is expected that this article will shed light on the diversity and possibility of investigations for a philosophy of science beyond meta-analysis, in other words, that is empirically engaged and socially informed. - A filosofia da ciência estuda a ciência, o modus operandi da ciência e o conhecimento científico. Convencionalmente, as investigações filosóficas desse campo se debruçam principalmente sobre aspectos metafísicos, epistemológicos e metodológicos da produção de conhecimento nas ciências. Muito embora seja tradicionalmente subdividida em filosofia geral das ciências e filosofia das ciências especiais, a filosofia da ciência de uma forma geral ainda se mantém distante das práticas científicas propriamente ditas. Para suprir tal demanda surge uma terceira subdivisão, ainda embrionária, a filosofia da ciência em prática. Este artigo apresenta uma breve introdução à filosofia da ciência em prática e à Sociedade de Filosofia da Ciência em Prática, discute seus objetivos e estratégias metodológicas, bem como seu engajamento social e empírico. Espero que, com esse artigo, seja possível trazer uma breve noção sobre a diversidade de investigações e as possibilidades de uma filosofia da ciência que pode ir para além do escopo meta-analítico, que pode ser empiricamente engajada e socialmente informada. (shrink)

Any account of Spinoza's understanding of attribute must be able to satisfy his definition criterion; that is, it must coherently accommodate the elements involved in his definition of attribute as “what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence” (E1d4). But this is not enough. There are several available readings that satisfy this criterion and are mutually incompatible. To know what Spinoza means we must supplement his definition criterion with a criterion aiming at consistency with other principles in (...) his system. With the definition and consistency criteria in the backdrop, the aim of this paper is to offer a critical overview of the current state of the debate on Spinoza's theory of attributes. (shrink)

Plantinga’s free will defense is sometimes regarded as a successful response to the logical problem of evil. Still, a recent objection concludes Plantinga’s defense and theodicy are incompatible. According to this objection, in Plantinga’s defense, Jesus’ having a creaturely essence entails that Jesus suffers from transworld depravity and sins in the actual world, but this result conflicts with Plantinga’s theodicy and with Christian theism, where Jesus is sinless. In this paper, I argue that this objection is unsound, because creaturely essences (...) suffer from transworld depravity only contingently, so it is not necessarily true that their instantiations go wrong in the actual world. Hence, Plantinga’s defense and theodicy are not incompatible, so both answers to the problem of evil can be endorsed in conjunction. (shrink)

The Roman years of Tommaso Campanella were made possible by the protection and patronage of the pope Urbano VIII Barberini. Campanella composed from 1627 to 1631 three series of lengthy Commentaria on the Poemata, the book of Barberini’s Latin poems. What are the Commentaria? This complex, full-length bunch of manuscripts is often dismissed as pure flattery or as another strange, slightly delirious fruit of the exalted mind of the prophet-monk. We think instead that the Commentaria were seen by Campanella as (...) a new start for his philosophical system, furthermore shedding on it a new light: the light of a system, and the reassuring clarity of a pedagogy. Moreover, with the “Collegio Barberino” project, strongly tied to the Commentaria, Campanella tries to lay the foundations of a new educational system fitted for the new Rome and the cultural needs of the 17th-century élite. (shrink)

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

Known as the Darwin of the twenty-first century, the German biologist Ernst Walter Mayr (1904-2005) studied a great variety of subjects such as Ornithology, Genetics, Evolution, Classification, History, and Philosophy of Biology. This scientist was a giant of the previous century and an icon of Evolutionary Biology. He became famous for his Biological Species Concept and his conclusion that allopatry is the main cause for the origin of species. He provided a decisive contribution to the New Systematics and was the (...) pioneer of the punctuated equilibrium idea. Mayr was one of the main architects of the evolutionary synthesis as also of the Neo-Darwinian wave. Evaluated together, all of his works reveal several elements of his ambition – to organize a philosophical conception inherent for Biology. An assiduous defender of autonomous Biology, Mayr asserted that four sets of factors in Biology differ from those in the Exact Sciences: (I) refutation of essentialism, mechanism, vitalism, and teleology; (II) some physical principles cannot be applied to Biology; (III) absence of general laws in Biology; and (IV) basic principles of biology and their specific character cannot be applied to the inanimate world. The present study took as an axis a minor or even invisible theme from the Ernst Mayr literature and aims to analyze critically the theoretical and epistemological basis that subsidizes – or not– the affirmation that Biology is an autonomous Science. - O biólogo alemão Ernst Walter Mayr (1904-2005), conhecido como o Darwin do século XXI, trabalhou com uma grande variedade de temas: Ornitologia, Genética, Evolução, Classificação, História e Filosofia da Biologia. Esse cientista foi um dos gigantes do século XX e um ícone para a Biologia Evolutiva. Ficou famoso com o seu Conceito Biológico de Espécie e sua conclusão de que a alopatria era a principal causa da origem das espécies. Forneceu uma contribuição decisiva à Nova Sistemática, foi precursor da ideia de equilíbrio pontuado e um dos principais arquitetos da síntese evolutiva, bem como do movimento Neodarwinista. Quando avaliados em conjunto, seus trabalhos revelam os diversos elementos de sua ambição – organizar um corpo de concepções filosóficas próprias da Biologia. Defensor assíduo de uma Biologia autônoma, Mayr afirmou que há quatro conjuntos de fatores que diferenciam a Biologia do conjunto das Ciências Exatas: (I) refutação do essencialismo, do mecanicismo, do vitalismo e da teleologia; (II) convicção de que certos princípios da Física não podem ser aplicados à Biologia; (III) ausência de leis naturais universais em Biologia; e (IV) percepção do caráter único de certos princípios básicos da Biologia não aplicáveis ao mundo inanimado. O presente artigo tomou por eixo um tema aparentemente menor ou mesmo invisível na obra de Ernst Mayr e pretende realizar uma análise crítica acerca de suas bases teóricas e epistemológicas que subsidiaram – ou não – a afirmação da Biologia como uma Ciência autônoma. (shrink)

Both patients and clinicians frequently report problems around communicating and assessing pain. Patients express dissatisfaction with their doctors and doctors often find exchanges with chronic pain patients difficult and frustrating. This chapter thus asks how we could improve pain communication and thereby enhance outcomes for chronic pain patients. We argue that improving matters will require a better appreciation of the complex meaning of pain terms and of the variability and flexibility in how individuals think about pain. We start by examining (...) the various accounts of the meaning of pain terms that have been suggested within philosophy and suggest that, while each of the accounts captures something important about our use of pain terms, none is completely satisfactory. We propose that pain terms should be viewed as communicating complex meanings, which may change across different communicative contexts, and this in turn suggests that we should view our ordinary thought about pain as similarly complex. We then sketch what a view taking seriously this variability in meaning and thought might look like, which we call the “polyeidic” view. According to this view, individuals tacitly occupy divergent stances across a range of different dimensions of pain, with one agent, for instance, thinking of pain in a much more “bodycentric” kind of way, while another thinks of pain in a much more "mindcentric” way. The polyeidic view attempts to expand the multidimensionality recognised in, e.g., biopsychosocial models in two directions: first, it holds that the standard triumvirate— dividing sensory/cognitive/affective factors— needs to be enriched in order to capture important distinctions within the social and psychological dimensions. Second, the polyeidic view attempts to explain (at least in part) why modulation of experience by these social and psychological factors is possible in the first place. It does so by arguing that because the folk concept of pain is complex, different weightings of the different parts of the concept can modulate pain experience in a variety of ways. Finally, we argue that adopting a polyeidic approach to the meaning of pain would have a range of measurable clinical outcomes. (shrink)

This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status (...) of one’s belief in the conclusion of an argument is a function of the epistemic status of the attitudes one has to the premises of that argument. One gets what one puts in: S’s belief in the conclusion C of an argument A has epistemic status E for S only if S’s belief in each of the premises C depends on also has epistemic status E.1 This is compatible, of course, with the epistemic status of S’s conclusion being greater than the epistemic status of the premises on which the conclusion of her reasoning depends. Furthermore, even though KFK applies more straightforwardly to non-suppositional inferences, we can also plausibly apply the principle to sup- positional reasoning if we treat S’s assuming for the sake of argument that p,2 as S assuming for the sake of argument that she knows that p.3 Although extremely plausible, philosophers have failed to present a concerted case in support of KFK. Most of their energy goes to articulating and/or defending some form of closure principle for knowledge.4 What is more, recently versions of this principle have been dismissed as problematic but I think without the reasons in its support been fully appreciated. This paper is an e fort to change the current state of affairs. Its focus is positive, however: my goal is to make the best case I can in support of KFK.5 To that end, the paper presents the reasons we have to accept KFK (§1), consid- ers an objection to the principle (§2), and situates the principle in the broader normative context of knowledge norms (§3). (shrink)

Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.

Book Review: De Regt, H. W. Understanding Scientific Understanding. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

In this paper, the relationship between the e-value of a complex hypothesis, H, and those of its constituent elementary hypotheses, Hj, j = 1… k, is analyzed, in the independent setup. The e-value of a hypothesis H, ev, is a Bayesian epistemic, credibility or truth value defined under the Full Bayesian Significance Testing mathematical apparatus. The questions addressed concern the important issue of how the truth value of H, and the truth function of the corresponding FBST structure M, relate to (...) the truth values of its elementary constituents, Hj, and to the truth functions of their corresponding FBST structures Mj, respectively. (shrink)

A Série Investigação Filosófica, uma iniciativa do Núcleo de Ensino e Pesquisa em Filosofia do Departamento de Filosofia da UFPel e do Grupo de Pesquisa Investigação Filosófica do Departamento de Filosofia da UNIFAP, sob o selo editorial do NEPFil online e da Editora da Universidade Federal de Pelotas, com auxílio financeiro da John Templeton Foundation, tem por objetivo precípuo a publicação da tradução para a língua portuguesa de textos selecionados a partir de diversas plataformas internacionalmente reconhecidas, tal como a Stanford (...) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, por exemplo. O objetivo geral da série é disponibilizar materiais bibliográficos relevantes tanto para a utilização enquanto material didático quanto para a própria investigação filosófica. (shrink)

John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.

La Genealogia della morale si presenta al lettore come un compatto ma articolato crocevia di temi e di problematiche del pensiero di Friedrich Nietzsche. L'opera è certo caratterizzata da una particolare unità tematica, ma è al tempo stesso ricca di spunti che offrono accessi a questioni di non secondaria importanza e che, nel loro complesso, definiscono la trama di un pensiero che manifesta la propria ricchezza e originalità al lettore più accorto. Di tale ricchezza si è cercato di rendere conto (...) nel presente volume, che raccoglie una serie di incursioni nel testo di Nietzsche a firma di studiosi italiani e stranieri, alcune delle quali sono state originariamente discusse nel corso di un seminario di ricerca svoltosi nell’ambito della Scuola di Dottorato in Filosofia dell’Università di Padova. Questi contributi affrontano, ciascuno a suo modo, la Genealogia della morale, illuminandone alcuni passaggi cruciali e intervenendo nella discussione di aspetti che si dimostrano significativi non solamente per approfondire ulteriormente la qualità e la rilevanza filosofiche dell'opera di Nietzsche, ma anche per valutarne il ruolo nella storia del pensiero occidentale contemporaneo. (shrink)

According to Steven Pinker and his associates the cooperative model of human communication fails, because evolutionary biology teaches us that most social relationships, including talk-exchange, involve combinations of cooperation and conflict. In particular, the phenomenon of the strategic speaker who uses indirect speech in order to be able to deny what he meant by a speech act (deniability of conversational implicatures) challenges the model. In reply I point out that interlocutors can aim at understanding each other (cooperation), while being in (...) conflict. Furthermore, Pinker’s strategic speaker relies on the Cooperative Principle when conveying a conversational implicature, and so non-cooperative behaviour (denial) only emerges as a response to a negative reaction from the audience. It is also doubtful in the cases Pinker presents whether a denial will successfully cancel the conversational implicature –change the audience’s interpretation of speaker’s meaning. I also argue that a strategic speaker might choose indirect speech due to the ignorability of conversational implicatures, in which case the strategic speaker can be highly cooperative. (shrink)

Many multinational corporations develop business operations in Europe. The current research attempts to fill the gap on how corporations can increase their political influence in this geography by exploring the joint effect of corporate political activity(CPA) and social responsibility (CSR) on political embeddedness and financial performance. Based on institutional theory and on a sample of autochthonous (European Union [EU]) and allochthonous (non-EU) firms with declared EU lobbying (from 2008to 2019) we conducted two studies. Based on a multi-level model, Study 1 (...) finds strong and robust evidence that boardroom gender diversity and EU lobbyists inter-actively increase EU political embeddedness. Complementarily, Study 2, which relies on general linear Modeling, suggests that allochthonous corporations are more profit-able when they display high-level political embeddedness and lobbying expenditures, combined with adoption of United Nations (UN) guidelines. Overall, findings show that lobbying in Europe pays off, especially when corporations strive to be aligned with EU ethical values and aspirations. Hiring lobbyists to be based in Brussels and promoting gender equality help establish EU political connections. Subsequently, findings highlight the role that EU political embeddedness, lobbying expenditures, and UN guidelines play in leveraging financial performance, especially across non-EU corporations. Regarding EU corporations, results show that a firm-level investment on CPA-CSR is particularly important. Overall, findings from this research support corporations that are growing businesses in Europe. KEYWORDScorporate political activity, corporate social responsibility, lobbying, return on assets (ROA),United Nations (UN_. (shrink)

According to Steven Pinker and his associates the cooperative model of human communication fails, because evolutionary biology teaches us that most social relationships, including talk-exchange, involve combinations of cooperation and conflict. In particular, the phenomenon of the strategic speaker who uses indirect speech in order to be able to deny what he meant by a speech act (deniability of conversational implicatures) challenges the model. In reply I point out that interlocutors can aim at understanding each other (cooperation), while being in (...) conflict. Furthermore, Pinker’s strategic speaker relies on the Cooperative Principle when conveying a conversational implicature, and so non-cooperative behaviour (denial) only emerges as a response to a negative reaction from the audience. It is also doubtful in the cases Pinker presents whether a denial will successfully cancel the conversational implicature –change the audience’s interpretation of speaker’s meaning. I also argue that a strategic speaker might choose indirect speech due to the ignorability of conversational implicatures, in which case the strategic speaker can be highly cooperative. (shrink)

One of Fabio Rossi’s most important works analyses the themes of evil and suffering in 20th-century French philosophy. Among others, Rossi presents Louis Lavelle’s contribution on such themes and his reading of the mutual influences between philosophical reflection, emotional experience and religious transcendence. The article aims to make use of some of the conceptual tools made available by Rossi and Lavelle in order to understand François Mauriac’s treatment of evil and suffering in some of his novels, namely Le Mystère Frontenac, (...) Noeud de vipères and Le Mal. The role of family bonds, social rules, the body and its weaknesses, and nature are among the themes around which Mauriac centers his reflection about suffering and its inevitable presence in human life. (shrink)

The paper introduces a new problem for fallibilist and infallibilist epistemologies – the diachronic threshold problem. As the name suggests, this is a problem similar to the well–known threshold problem for fallibilism. The new problem affects both fallibilism and infallibilism, however. The paper argues that anyone who worries about the well known problem for fallibilism should also worry about this new, diachronic version of the problem.

Anti-luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck (...) is of no help to the anti-luck epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti-luck epistemologist's coveted noncircular analysis of knowledge. (shrink)

The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact that S is “Moored”), cannot (in the logical sense of “cannot”) be known by S while S is in that situation. The paper (...) starts the job of mapping what can be said about this feature of Gettier situations. The goal is to stimulate further exploration into this yet uncharted territory. (shrink)

A direct implication of E=K seems to be that false beliefs cannot justify other beliefs, for no false belief can be part of one’s total evidence and one’s total evidence is what inferentially justifies belief. The problem with this alleged implication of E=K, as Comesaña and Kantin :447–454, 2010) have noted, is that it contradicts a claim Gettier cases rely on. The original Gettier cases relied on two principles: that justification is closed under known entailment, and that sometimes one is (...) justified in believing a falsehood. In this paper I argue that E=K, contrary to what Comesaña and Kantin would want us to believe, is compatible with the agent being justified in believing a falsehood. (shrink)

The Chomskian holds that the grammars that linguists produce are about human psycholinguistic structures, i.e. our mastery of a grammar, our linguistic competence. But if we encountered Martians whose psycholinguistic processes differed from ours, but who nevertheless produced sentences that are extensionally equivalent to the set of sentences in our English and shared our judgements on the grammaticality of various English sentences, then we would count them as being competent in English. A grammar of English is about what the Martians (...) and we share. In this note, I argue that a recent attack on the Martian Argument by Laurence fail to mitigate its force. (shrink)

O objetivo desta obra é elucidar qual seja a noção de liberdade (libertas) desenvolvida por Guilherme de Ockham (1284?-1347?) em sua Opera Politica; tendo como locus de pesquisa, especificamente, o Livro I do Tratado I, intitulado Sobre o poder do papa e do clero, da Terceira Parte do Diálogo. Trata-se, com efeito, da liberdade cristã (ou evangélica); a qual é entendida, nesse contexto, como um princípio filosófico-teológico: lex christiana est lex libertatis (a lei cristã é uma lei de liberdade). Através (...) dessa argumentação, o Venerabilis Inceptor empreende sua incisiva crítica à doutrina da plenitudo potestatis papalis (plenitude do poder papal); mediante a qual os pontífices romanos buscavam legitimar sua pretensa plenitude de poder espiritual e temporal. De fato, se os cristãos são livres, por força da lei evangélico-cristã, então o papa não pode possuir regularmente tal plenitude de poder; pois se a possuísse, os fiéis seriam privados de sua liberdade religiosa e política; e o pontífice, consequentemente, se tornaria um herege. Assim sendo, essa liberdade evangélico-cristã deve ser caracterizada como liberdade religiosa e também política. (shrink)

Los desacuerdos acerca de la ontología científica han sido frecuentemente reconstruidos como el resultado de una disputa entre stances epistémicas rivales. En el presente trabajo, (i) caracterizamos algunos de estos desacuerdos como desacuerdos profundos. Además, (ii) mostramos que los desacuerdos profundos sobre ontología científica pueden surgir no solo de la adopción de diferentes stances epistémicas, sino entre posiciones que se encuadran dentro de una misma stance. El desarrollo de ese punto nos permite, a su vez, establecer una distinción entre tipos (...) de desacuerdos profundos y explorar la posibilidad de que existan diferencias de grado entre ellos. (shrink)

In Metaphysics Γ 4-6 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed not just to denying the PNC, but also to asserting its contrary. In this paper, I offer an analysis of this commitment. I try to show that Aristotle is working with a specific idea in mind: a Protagoreanism ontologically linked to the flux doctrine, as Plato suggested in Theaetetus 152-160.

Edward Nieznanski developed in 2007 and 2008 two different systems in formal logic which deal with the problem of evil. Particularly, his aim is to refute a version of the logical problem of evil associated with a form of religious determinism. In this paper, we revisit his first system to give a more suitable form to it, reformulating it in first-order modal logic. The new resulting system, called N1, has much of the original basic structure, and many axioms, definitions, and (...) theorems still remain; however, some new results are obtained. If the conclusions attained are correct and true, then N1 solves the problem of evil through the refutation of a version of religious determinism, showing that the attributes of God in Classical Theism, namely, those of omniscience, omnipotence, infallibility, and omnibenevolence, when adequately formalized, are consistent with the existence of evil in the world. We consider that N1 is a good example of how formal systems can be applied in solving interesting philosophical issues, particularly in Philosophy of Religion and Analytic Theology, establishing bridges between such disciplines. (shrink)

This article aims to analyze some aspects of the work Manual para a Vida Feliz, the result of classes given by Epictetus, and recorded by his student Ariano. We will consider the situations that, according to Epictetus, depend on the individual and those that do not depend on their action. In particular, this analysis will focus on fragments 1 to 6 of the manual, given the length to be analyzed in an article. To account for the proposed object, this analysis (...) will be carried out, based on Hadot's (2015) perspective on the subject. The research method used will be bibliographic review. As for the methodology, it will be deductive in nature. Our studies show that his teachings are based on the essential principles of Stoic philosophy. Therefore, the only good that exists, for him, is the moral good. Furthermore, all human action is based on judgment and nature is coherent with itself. From this perspective, what depends on the individual, in this life, is what is under their control and everything that is beyond their control does not depend on them. Therefore, worrying about what is not under your control is considered useless and a waste of time. (shrink)

This article aims to elucidate, albeit in a preliminary way, the concept of liquidity in Zygmunt Bauman and its effects onsociety. The deductive-inductive method will be used. As for the methodology, this will be of a bibliographic nature. This study is in line with what the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1925-2017), in his texts, postulates that Modernity can be divided into two phases: Solid Modernity and Liquid Modernity. The first began in the 15th century and lasted until the 19th century; the (...) second began in the 20th century and continues to the present time. To describe modern society from the end of the 20th century, Bauman uses the metaphor of 'liquidity', aiming to point out that the contemporary world is going through a period of uncertainty, ephemerality and instabilities. According to Bauman, the modern ideal coined between the 15th and 19th centuries postulated the primacy of reason and the autonomy of capitalist man and such assumptions led society to liquid modernity. In this liquid “contemporaneity”, nothing is lasting, everything is volatile, ephemeral; consumption is the social parameter, whether of the individual, the family, the State or religion. (shrink)

Transdisciplinary research knits together knowledge from diverse epistemic communities in addressing social-environmental challenges, such as biodiversity loss, climate crises, food insecurity, and public health. This paper reflects on the roles of philosophy of science in transdisciplinary research while focusing on Indigenous and other subaltern forms of knowledge. We offer a critical assessment of demarcationist approaches in philosophy of science and outline a constructive alternative of transdisciplinary philosophy of science. While a demarcationist focus obscures the complex relations between epistemic communities, transdisciplinary (...) philosophy of science provides resources for meeting epistemic and political challenges of collaborative knowledge production. (shrink)

By definition, pain is a sensory and emotional experience that is felt in a particular part of the body. The precise relationship between somatic events at the site where pain is experienced, and central processing giving rise to the mental experience of pain remains the subject of debate, but there is little disagreement in scholarly circles that both aspects of pain are critical to its experience. Recent experimental work, however, suggests a public view that is at odds with this conceptualisation. (...) By demonstrating that the public does not necessarily endorse central tenets of the “mental” view of pain (subjectivity, privacy, and incorrigibility), experimental philosophers have argued that the public holds a more “body-centric” view than most clinicians and scholars. Such a discrepancy would have important implications for how the public interacts with pain science and clinical care. In response, we tested the hypothesis that the public is capable of a more “mind-centric” view of pain. Using a series of vignettes, we demonstrate that in situations which highlight mental aspects of pain the public can, and does, recognize pain as a mental phenomenon. We also demonstrate that the public view is subject to context effects, by showing that the public’s view is modified when situations emphasizing mental and somatic aspects of pain are presented together. (shrink)

Transdisciplinary research challenges the divide between Indigenous and academic knowledge by bringing together epistemic resources of heterogeneous stakeholders. The aim of this article is to explore causal explanations in a traditional fishing community in Brazil that provide resources for transdisciplinary collaboration, without neglecting differences between Indigenous and academic experts. Semi-structured interviews were carried out in a fishing village in the North shore of Bahia and our findings show that community members often rely on causal explanations for local ecological phenomena with (...) different degrees of complexity. While these results demonstrate the ecological expertise of local community members, we also argue that recognition of local expertise needs to reflect on differences between epistemic communities by developing a culturally sensitive model of transdisciplinary knowledge negotiation. (shrink)